We assess drivers of FDI in a panel of BRICS and MINT countries for the period 2001-2011.
Introduction
Foreign-owned investments have been in existence since the colonial era in many parts of the globe. After a substantial drop in these investments in the 1980s, the need for security in food, energy and water is pushing many countries to adopt this new strategy of investment, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 food crisis (Arezki et al., 2013) . In essence, policies favouring restrictions to trade and capital that were predominant in developing nations in the 1970s and 1980s were considerably eased after these same countries suffered from declining economic prosperity and foreign investment (Rodrik, 1998) . Hence, some domestic industries for which these policies were initially meant to protect bore much of the brunt of diminishing social and private returns (De Mello, 1997; Dupasquier & Osakwe, 2006; UNESCAP, 2000 2 Apkan et al., 2014 . Hence, the policies known as 'structural adjusment' were fundamentally meant to address the capital scarcity in developing countries, while at the same time enabling multinational corporations from the more developed world to benefit from the cheap labour in less developed nations (Asongu, 2013a (Asongu, , 2014a UNCTAD 3 , 2013) 4 .
With the current trend of land grab in the world, there is a growing strand in the literature focusing on foreign land acquisitions (FLA) in developing countries (Osabuohien, 2014 (Osabuohien, , 2015 . This rush for foreign direct investment (FDI/FLA) extends well beyond African, Asian & Latin American countries in the south of the globe to Ukraine, Russia, and Australia.
Two types of foreign investor have been documented: a European private sector characterised for the most part by investment banks & hedge funds and Asian investment of private and public origin (UN, 2010) . Reasons advanced for motivating this FDI/FLA range from debates to more fundamental poverty alleviation goals. Consistent with World Bank (2007) ,Lipton (2009) and Arezki et al. (2013) , the underlying rush needs to provide some guarantee for initiatives favouring smallholder structures of agriculture which are friendlier towards poverty alleviation. The intuition for this line of narrative is the Asian experience of relatively higher poverty reduction which has been substantially driven by small scale agriculture (Loayza & Raddatz 2010; De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2010; Asongu & Nguena, 2015; ). Collier (2008) also 2 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 3 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 4 It is also interesting to note that not all privatisation policies delivered the much needed FDI. For instance, as shown by Rolfe & Woodward (2004) , this has been the experience of Zambia. The need for FDI has been further highlighted in recent literature on population studies which show that unless other sources of investment are channelled into developing countries (especially in Africa), only public investment would be used to setttle issues arising from the burgeoning population growth and resulting unmployment (Asongu, 2013b) . follows this argument for sub-Saharan Africa because the region has been substantially affected by the 2008 global food price changes.
The theoretical underpinnings of FDI/FLA location substantially draws on Vernon (1966) who also documented a product life cycle which articulates four main stages: introduction, growth, maturity and decline. According to this pattern, new products are introduced in developed and later diffused to less developed nations over time. Hence, these fundamental stages susbtantially influence the location decision of mulitinational corporations to inter alia set-up production facilities abroad and to benefit from lower production cost and address concerns of growing demand in less developed countries. Consistent with Apkan et al. (2014) , the electric paradigm conceived by Dunning (1988 Dunning ( , 1993 Dunning ( , 2000 provide a general perspective for rationalizing FDI location decisions by multinational companies. According to this model, factors like the geography, scope and industrial elements of FDI by mutlinational corporations are substantially affected by interactions in the following three sets of interdependent indicators: location specificity, strategic ownership advantages and internationalisation. This is broadly consistent with the recent survey of theoretical underpinnings on determinants by Faeth (2009) .
We devote some space to discussing the findings of the empirical literature on the deteminants of FDI/FLA. Consistent with recent literature (Akpan et al., 2014) , it depends on a number of factors, among others: estimation techniques, context of papers, data span and proxies used for indicators (Moosa, 2002; Asiedu, 2006; Hajzler, 2014; Moosa & Cardak, 2006; Asiedu, 2002; Ranjan & Agrawal, 2011; Buchanan et al., 2012; Sekkat & Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2007) . We follow Asongu & Nguena (2014) in discussing them in six main strands, namely: quality of business climate (infrastructure, trade, returns & institutions), tenure security, weak governance, resource-grab motivations, regional factors and global economic shocks. The first is linked to FDI while the others broadly apply to FDI & FLA.
On the first strand that is focused on business climate , Amendolagine et al. (2013) have investigated factors motivating FDI and concluded that features like, local partners, market factors and time are significant. Other documented characteristics include:
infrastructure and return to capital (Asiedu, 2002) , market size, trade openness and availability of infrastructure (Vijayakumar et al., 2010; Bartels et al, 2009; Kinda, 2010; Darley, 2012; Anyanwu, 2012; Akpan et al., 2014; Büthe & Milner, 2008; Bartels et al., 2014; Jadhav, 2012) ; the abundance of cheap labour and incentive packages (Vijayakumar et al., 2010; Tuomi, 2011; Asongu, 2014b) . Institutional factors include: corruption-control (De Maria, 2010; Wei, 2010) , democracy (Asiedu & Lien, 2011) , political stability (Busse & Hefeker, 2007) , economic governance (Jadhav & Katti, 2012) and good institutional quality (Gastanaga et al., 1998; Neumayer & Spess, 2005; Kinda, 2010; Tuomi, 2011; Asongu, 2012; Cleeve, 2012; ; Abdioglu et al., 2013; Hayakawa et al., 2013; Bartels et al., 2014) .
In the second strand, Areski et al. (2013) who document the attractive force of weak governance have also confirmed business climate quality is an attractive feature for FDI/FLA.
Here, bad governance motivates foreign investments. While Kolstad & Wiig (2011) have confirmed poor institutional quality as the primary factor motivating FDI from China to Africa, Asongu & Aminkeng (2013) have balanced the narrative by concluding that the motivations of Western companies are not much different from those of Chinese corporations.
The third stream focuses on land tenure security issues which have been documented as an important factor in FLA (UN, 2010; Arezki et al., 2013) . Systems of land tenure affect food security (Economic Commission for Africa, 2014) and have been identified as one of the fundamental factors influencing FDI/FLA (Ingwe et al. 2010; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008) . The narrative which is in line with Wouterse et al. (2011) broadly characterises the issues as "taken away the land of peasants which are possessed on communal tenure systems that starkly contrast with official land titles related to 'indigenous colonialist' controlled neoliberal capitalist systems who have used various forms of manipulation in the past to alienate Africans from their land" (Asongu & Nguena, 2014, p.4) . German et al. (2011) argue that in spite of their recognition, customary rights are not fundamentally protected by FLA agreements. Along the same lines: Thaler (2013) concludes that foreign investment target countries that are characterised by authoritarian and corrupt governments associated with weak land tenure security; in countries where the rights of the local population are not clearly articulated and governance is poor, FLAs are linked to substantial risks for the population (Liu, 2013) and local institutions do not substantially affect decisions in FLA because of overwhelming state power (Osabuohien 2014) .
Resource-seeking motivations constitute the fourth strand (Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013; Lay & Nolte, 2014) . Whereas a negative nexus has been established between natural resource-wealth and FDI in the presence of protectionist policies (Jadhav, 2012; Rogmans & Ebbers, 2013) , the mainstream narrative suggests a reverse relationship. For instance, Lay & Nolte (2014) have extended Arezki et al. (2013) to confirm the positive connection between natural resource endowment and FDI. The Kostad & Wiig (2011) conclusion on a resource-thirsty China has also been debunked by Asongu & Aminkeng (2013) who conclude that the resource motivations of Western nations are very much identical to those of China.
In the fifth strand, we find literature on global shocks like food and financial crises as the principal drivers of FDI/FLA for agriculture purposes (Wouterse et al., 2011) . Following the 2008 food crisis, countries that greatly depended on food imports have been acquiring land abroad for food security agricultural purposes (UN, 2010) . According to Clapp (2013) (Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013) , the existence of local partners based on strong colonial networks (Amendolagine et al., 2013) and China's strategy that is oriented towards non-interference and partnership (Yin & Vaschetto, 2011) .
In the light of the above, FDI is mutually beneficial to both investment corporations and domestic economies. Some advantages for host nations include: finance, employment and positive externalities like managerial experience, technology & skills transfer and corporate governance. The benefits of the investing company are, inter alia: cheap labour, market access, natural resource availability and appealing externalities from bilateral and multilateral trade policies (Akpan et al., 2014) . In accordance with the narrative, as of 2012, (2013) and Akpan et al. (2014) In spite of the increasing importance of the nine nations in attracting FDI and influencing the shape of the global economy, as far as we have reviwed, the FDI literature on these countries is scanty. FDI determinants in the BRICS have been examined by both the BRICS and MINT economies. Fourth, we have found that the effects of governance may be insignificant (Akpan et al., 2014) or limited to the rule of law (Jadhav, 2012) and economic governance (Jadhav & Katti, 2012) . We extend the dimension of institutions by bundling and unbundling governance dynamics. In essence, we use ten governance indicators, The rest of the paper is organised in the following manner. Data and methodology are covered in Section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and discussion of results. We conclude in Section 4.
Data and Methodology

Data
The (Lehnert et al., 2013) , net FDI flows as a percentage of GDP (Asiedu, 2002) , unidirectional FDI inflow into recipient countries (Rogmans & Ebbers, 2013) and net FDI inflow (Jadhav, 2002 (2002) and Akpan et al. (2014) The summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 3 below. It could be inferred from it that the variables are comparable. Moreover, the degree of variation is too substantial for us to expect reasonable estimated relationships to emerge. 
Methodology
Principal Component Analysis
Consistent with Asongu & Nwachukwu (2014a) , the substantial degree of substitution among governance indicators in Table 5 implies some overlapping information. We employ Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to address this concern. The use of the PCA technique also enables us to bundle governance variables. This statistical method facilitates the reduction of a high set of correlated variables into a smaller combination of uncorrelated indicators known as Principal Components (PCs). In the process, four more governance indicators are blended from the six individual governance variables identified in Section 2.1.
The PC governance dynamics comprise: Political governance, which measures the election and replacement of political leaders is approximated by: voice & accountability and political stability/non-violence; Economic governance, which is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities, is denoted by regulation quality and government effectiveness ; Institutional governance, which is defined as the respect of the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them is measured by the rule of law and corruption-control (Andrés et al., 2014) .
Consistent with the underlying literature, we use the Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) criterion for the retention of common factors. Hence, we retain factors or PCs with an eigenvalue higher than the mean (or one). In Table 4 below, it can be observed that: General governance (G.Gov) which is a first PC has an eigenvalue of 4.514 and represents about 75% of variation in the original six individual governance variables. Borrowing from Asongu & Nwachukwu (2014b) , we devote some space to discussing potential concerns that may arise when regressors originate from previous regressions. Three issues have been documented by Pagan (1984, p. 242 ) on the quality of resulting estimators.
They are: (i) efficiency, (ii) consistency and, (iii) validity of inferences at the second stage of the estimation. According to the conclusions of the author, whereas estimators from a twostep procedure are consistent and efficient, inferences provided by a few are valid. This narrative is broadly in accordance with a recent literature on the use methods such as PCA which relies on a two-step regression modelling (Oxley & McAleer, 1993; McKenzie & McAleer, 1997; Ba & Ng, 2006; Westerlund & Urbain, 2013a) .
The use of PCs within the framework of this analysis has been documented by Westerlund & Urbain (2012 , 2013b who have built on previous papers (Pesaran, 2006; Stock & Watson, 2002; Bai, 2003; Bai, 2009; Greenaway-McGrevy et al., 2012) . As to what error are inherent in PC regressors, they have remarked on the possibility of normal inferences with PC-factors augmenting regressions, if the coefficients that are estimated converge toward their real values at the rate: NT , (where T is the number of time series and N, the number of cross sections). We argue that, any potential issues of small sample bias are not very feasible here because we are constrained by the sample size. In essence, only nine countries constitute the MINT and BRICS among fast growing developing countries. 
2 Estimation Technique
We assess contemporary and non-contemporary determinants using panel regressions.
The choice between panel fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) is decided by the outcome of the Hausman test for endogeneity. We also control for time-effects.
Assuming the Hausman test for endogeneity is rejected, Eq.(1) and Eq.
(2) below denote the corresponding contemporary and non-contemporary specifications respectively of FE regressions.
Where: t i FDI , is the Foreign Direct Investment for country i at period t ; is a constant, W is the vector of determinants i  is the country-specific effect, t  is the time-specific effect. and t i,  the error term. The regressions are specified with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors.
The pairwise correlation matrix in Table 6 below helps us in mitigating potential problems arising from multicollinearity and overparameterization. Interestingly, the linear association between Gross FDI and our governance variables, with the exception of political stability/non-violence is negative. The inference is that reforms in these other governance variables by themselves could potentially reduce the attractiveness of BRICS and MINT economies as destinations for FDI. Such provides support for the weak governance effect suggested by Areski et.al. (2013) . This finding is consistent with our indicators of political governance, regulation quality, corruption-control, institutional governance and general governance regardless of whether the Gross FDI or Net FDI were considered in the correlation analysis. By contrast, the correlation coefficients for the indicators of economic governance, government effectiveness and the rule of law reverted to a positive sign when Net FDI was used in the pairwise correlation. We may surmise that policy actions which enhance the quality of institutions in terms of these last three dynamics may help curtail the problem of reverse investment or disinvestment in our BRICS and MINT states, even if they might not necessarily lead to a significant increase in inward direct investment. Tables 7 and 8 respectively. 
Empirical results
Presentation of results
358 ---0.352 0.354 0.354 Fisher 11.292*** ---11.297*** 11.28*** 11.726*** 11.425*** ---11.302*** 11.342*** 11.329** *  Observations  90  90  90  90  90  90  90  90  90  90 *, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The Random Effects specifications are not modelled with time-effects due to issues in degrees of freedom. Accordingly, the matrices become 'positive definite' when the model is specified with 'time-effects'.
The results from the contemporary specifications may be summarised as follows.
First, the significance of governance dynamics are as follows in increasing order of magnitude: general governance (0.561), political governance (0.595), economic governance (0.832), political stability (1.006), regulation quality (1.669) and government effectiveness (2.035). Second, while institutional governance and its corresponding components (rule of law and corruption-control) have insignificant effects, the impact of voice & accountability is persistently negative. A possible explanation for this surprising result is that freedom of speech, accountability and press reporting on matters such as minimum wages, health and safety, environmental controls, tax evasion and human rights abuse may not favour returns to direct investment. Third, the motivation to bundle governance variables is articulated by the effect of political governance which is significantly positive while one of its components (voice and accountability) is consistently negative. Fourth, the signs for the coefficients for most of our governance dynamics reverted from negative in the pairwise correlation analysis to positive in the panel fixed and random effect models. This may be construed as an indication that FDI flows are not simply motivated by governance reforms per se, but by the interrelatedness between these structural adjustments and the above-mentioned persistent country attributes. Fifth, the significant control variables have the expected signs.
Accordingly, infrastructure and natural resources positively influence Gross FDI flows.
The following outcomes are established for non-contemporary specifications in Table   8 . First, the significance of the governance dynamics are as follows in increasing order of 
Further discussion of results and policy implications
We discuss the results in four main strands: differences in tendencies of effect on With respect to the magnitude of estimated coefficients in the contemporary model, the dominance of economic governance and its key components (regulation quality and government effectiveness) are consistent with the recent findings of Oluwatobi et al. (2014) .
They have shown that these dimesions are the most effective governance dynamics for attracting innovation into Africa. This inference is contingent on the hypothesis that FDI could also be a proxy for innovation (Andrés et al., 2014, p.10 Asongu & Nwachukwu (2014b) in which lifelong learning (which is the consolidation of knowledge acquired during three-levels of education) has a higher effect on political stability than the individual independent effects of various educational channels. As a policy implication, a concurrent execution of the significant components of the political, economic and institutional governance reforms as part of a structural adjustment program could clarify the attractiveness of our BRICS and MINT economies as a future destination for FDI.
Conclusion
We The following four broad general findings are established. First, while the majority of our governance determinants of Gross FDI are significant, they are overwhelmingly insignificant for Net FDI. This is consistent with both contemporary and non-contemporary specifications.
Second, with respect to the contemporary specifications, the significance of the governance dynamics in increasing order of magnitude are as follows: general governance (0.561), political governance (0.595), economic governance (0.832), political stability (1.006), regulation quality (1.669) and government effectiveness (2.035). Then too, while institutional governance and its corresponding components (rule of law and corruptioncontrol) have insignificant effects, the contributions of political governance and its dimensions (voice & accountability and political stability) and economic governance and its elements (regulation quality and government effectiveness) are significantly different from zero. Besides, the decision to bundle governance variables is justified by the effect of political governance which is significantly positive, although the effect of one of its components (voice & accountability) is significantly negative.
Third, in terms of non-contemporary relationships, we note that the significance of the governance dynamics in ascending order of magnitude are: economic governance ( 
